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Civil R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - R E M E D I E ~ - R E I N ~ T AS
A TA E
REMEDY
M E N TIN SECTION
1983 ACTIONS-Burton v. Cascade School District Union High
School No. 5, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 69
(1975)
In July, 1970, the principal of Cascade High School in Oregon
confronted Peggy Burton, a nontenured teacher and supervisor of
girls sports activities, with information that Burton was a homosexual. The information had been conveyed to the principal by
the mother of one of Burton's students. When confronted with the
allegations, Burton admitted to being a "practicing homosexual."
She reiterated the admission a t a special school board meeting
held to discuss the allegation. The school board passed a resolution to suspend Burton from her teaching position based on her
admission. In order that the resolution might more closely comply
with Oregon statutory requirements, it was later altered to read
that the dismissal was for the "immorality" of being a practicing
homosexual. '
Burton filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983* against the
school board and the board officials personally, seeking a declaratory judgment that her dismissal for being a practicing homosexual violated her civil rights. The suit also sought damages and
reinstatement to her teaching position.
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon
held that the dismissal was improper because the Oregon statute
was unconstitutionally vague and awarded Burton the rest of the
year's salary which she would have earned under her one-year
contract, plus an additional half year's salary, and $750 for attorney fees and costs. The district court also ordered the defendants
to expunge all references to the plaintiff's dismissal from the
records of school board meetings and school personnel files. The
1. Ch. 84, Ej 1, [I9691 Ore. Laws (repealed by ch. 298, Ej 9, [I9731 Ore. Laws)
provided for dismissal of teachers during the period of contract only for, inter alia, immorality. The statute, as applied to probationary or nontenured teachers, has been replaced by ORE.REV. STAT.Ej 342.835 (1974), which .provides for dismissal a t any time
during the probationary period or refusal t o renew a probationary teacher's contract at
the end of the contract term, "for any cause deemed in good faith sufficient by the board."
2. 42 U.S.C. Ej 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action a t law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
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court refused, however, to order that she be reinstated to her
teaching position."
Burton appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the district court should have
granted reinstatement. The court of appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Section 1983, the basis of Burton's suit, was enacted in 1871
as an aid to the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The
remedy provided by section 1983 for a deprivation of rights is civil
liability "in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."The cases that have construed and applied
the section leave no doubt that both damages' and equitable
relieP are appropriate remedies. Reinstatment is an equitable
3. Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254, 255
(D. Ore. 19731, aff'd, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 69 (1975).
4. CONG.GI.ORE,42d Cong., 1st Sess. 317 (1871) (remarks of Mr. Shellabarger).
5. 42 U.S.C. 4 1983 (1970), quoted in full in note 2 supra.
6. See, e.g., Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist., 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Cotton Plant School Dist. No. 1, 479 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1973); Wall
v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Chase v. Fall Mountain
Regional School Dist., 330 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.H. 1971); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp.
863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, reu'd in part on other grounds, sub nom. Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Lucia v. Duggan,
303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969).
7. E.g., Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist., 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974);
Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cotton Plant School
Dist. No. 1, 479 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1973); Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477
F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Gieringer v. Center School Dist. No. 58,477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973); Fisher v.
Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Cooley v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 282 (8th Cir.
1972); Butts v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971); Rolfe v.
County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.
1967); Wall v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Board
of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967); Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364
F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966); Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th
Cir. 1966); Franklin v. County School Bd., 360 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1966); Vega v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 385 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F. Supp. 661 (D.
Ida. 1974); Bradley v. Cothern, 384 F. Supp. 1216 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Seaman v. Spring
Lake Park Independent School Dist. No. 16, 363 F. Supp. 944 (D. Minn. 1973); Doherty
v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Chase v. Fall Mountain Reg. School Dist.,
330 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.H. 1971); Hanover Township Fed'n of Teachers v. Hanover Community School Corp., 318 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir.
1972); Roberts v. Lake Cent. School Corp., 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Sostre v.
Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds,
s u b nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978
(1972); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969).
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r e m e d ~as
; ~such, it will be awarded only if the plaintiff can show
that his remedy a t law is inadequate? Further, the award of reinstatement remains discretionary with the trial judge, who may
weigh the advantages and inconveniences to both parties in determining whether to make the award?

A. Nature of the Right and its Effect on the Remedy
Although the courts, when fashioning equitable remedies in
section 1983 actions, might be expected to follow traditional principles of equity," the nature of the right alleged to have been
violated appears to result in some deviation from those principles.
In numerous recent cases, the courts have awarded reinstatement
without discussing the adequacy of other remedies and without
reference to the discretionary nature of the award of reinstatement. In these cases, consisting principally of instances where
dismissal was racially motivated,'* or where dismissal came in
retaliation for exercise of free expression,'"he award of reinstatement has appeared automatic, if not mandatory.I4 In other cases,
however, the courts, basing their decision on either the adequacy
of another remedyf5or their own discretion,"%ave denied rein8. Jinks v. Mays, 464 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir. 1972).
ON THE LAWOF REMEDIES
8 2.5, a t 57 (1973).
9. Id. ; see D. DOBBS,HANDBOOK
HANDBOOK
OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF EQUITY
10. D. DORBS,supra note 9; H. MCCIJNTOCK,
B 23, at 49, 51, (j 144, a t 383 (2d ed. 1948).
11. See Abernathy v. Patterson, 295 F.2d 452, 456-58 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 986 (1962).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Cotton Plant School Dist. No. 1, 479 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.
1973); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Wall v. Stanly County
Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th
Cir. 1966); Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966);
Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966); Franklin v.
County School Bd., 360 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1966).
13. See, e.g., Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973); Gieringer v. Center
School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); Karp v.
Becken, 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973); Butts v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 436 F.2d
728 (5th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1003 (1967); Roberts v. Lake Cent. School Corp., 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Lucia
v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969).
14. The right of association has, in many instances, been redressed similarly. See,
e.g., Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Wright v. Southeast Ala. Gas Dist.,
376 F. Supp. 780 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973);
Chase v. Fall Mountain Regional School Dist., 330 F. Supp 388 (D.N.H. 1971); Hanover
Township Fed'n of Teachers v. Hanover Community School Corp., 318 F. Supp. 757 (N.D.
Ind. 1970).
15. See Knowles v. Board of Public Instruction, 405 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1969).
16. See, e.g., Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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statement despite the fact that dismissal constituted a violation
of constitutionally protected rights.
B. Judicial Discretion in Section 1983 Actions
Courts may generally exercise discretion to grant or withhold
equitable relief. In deciding how to exercise that discretion they
normally balance the competing interests of the parties. In section 1983 actions, however, the courts have occasionally indicated
t h a t certain interests opposing the award of equitable relief
should not be weighed in the balancing process.I7One factor the
courts have sometimes refused to consider in the balancing process is the antagonism reinstatement may generate. For example,
in Bradley v. Cothern,IRafter ordering reinstatement for a teacher
who had been terminated for failure to comply with maternity
leave policies, the court said, "Although it is true that reinstating
Mrs. Bradley to the District might revive some antagonisms, it
is clear that this would not be a proper basis for denying such
relief."IHIn Sterzing u. Fort Bend Independent School D i ~ t r i c t , ~ "
the district court refused to grant reinstatement even though a
teacher's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated, based in part on the finding that reinstatement of the
teacher would only revive antagonism^.^' The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, finding the possible revival of antagonism to
be an incorrect legal standard upon which to base the denial of
reinstatement .22
Generally speaking, however, the appellate courts have recognized the trial courts' discretion in suits for reinstatement or
other equitable relief. Further, they have accepted a wide range
of considerations as proper for the balancing process. For exame
Circuit Court of
ple, in Abeyta u. Town of T a ~ s , ~ V hTenth
Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of reinstatement to a
17. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), the Supreme Court reversed
a lower court decision that denied relief to a plaintiff who had been refused service in a
restaurant because he was in the company of blacks. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, said, "The protection of constitutional rights may not be
watered down because some members of the public actively oppose the exercise of constitutional rights by others." Id. a t 234. Since Adickes, lower court decisions have reflected
,Justice Brennan's point of view.
18. 384 F. Supp. 1216 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
19. Id. a t 1224 n.17 (citation omitted).
20. 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974).
21. Id. a t 663.
22. 496 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1974).
23. 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974).
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police officer who had been dismissed from the force in violation
of statutory procedures. The court said:
This decision was a matter within its discretion and will not be
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.

....
Finally we believe reinstatement with back wages would
impose a considerable burden on the town of Taos, whose actions were in good faith. Equitable relief should not be granted
where the hardship to the defendant substantially outweighs the
benefit to the plaintiff .24

In Knowles v. Board of Public Instr~ction,~"he Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in denying a black teacher's request to be transferred to an integrated school subject to an integration order,
stated:
Even if we were to consider this case as a proceeding under
the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C.A. 9 1983, the trial court has
broad power to grant or deny the equitable relief sought. We
conclude, therefore, that on the state of the record, it was not
error for the trial court to deny the individual injunctive relief
sought by the a ~ p e l l a n t . ~ "

Also, in Brown v. Board of Education of Chicago,2i the court, in
denying an injunction requiring the school board to spend as
much money on minority and poor students as it was spending
on white students, quoted with approval from the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Lemon v. K u r t ~ m a n : ~ ~
[I]n constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and
what is workable. . . .

....

In equity, as nowhere else, courts eschew rigid absolutes
and look to the practical realities and necessities inescapably
involved in reconciling competing interests, notwithstanding
that those interests have constitutional roots.29
24. Id. at 328 (footnote omitted).
25. 405 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1969).
26. Id. at 1207 (footnote omitted).
27. 386 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
28. 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
29. Id. at 200-01 (footnote omitted). Though the equitable remedy requested in
Knowles, Brown, and Lemon was an injunction, reinstatement is also an equitable remedy
to which the same principles are applicable.
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The Void -for- Vagueness Doctrine

The void-for-vagueness doctrine rest on the cases of International Harvester Co. of America v. KentuckyyJ0and Connally
v. General Construction C O . The
~ ~ Supreme Court announced
in Connally that a statute "so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess a t its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law."32
The leading Supreme Court case dealing with dismissal of a
teacher under a vague statute is Keyishian v. Board of Regents.V'here the Court found a statute providing for dismissal
of teachers who violated a prohibition on the utterance of "treain the classroom to be uncons o n or~"seditious"
~ ~ ~ statements
~
stitutionally vague." Teachers, the Court said, could not be sure
that mere academic discussion of ideas repugnant to the community's concepts of government might not result in dismissal.
The atmosphere thus created by the statute had a chilling effect
on free speech and freedom of academic i n q ~ i r y . ~ "

Burton, in her appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
claimed her dismissal was unconstitutional in four respects:
(1) the statute upon which it was based was unconstitutionally
vague; (2) it was violative of due process because of the school
board's failure to show a rational nexus between immoral conduct
and job fitness; (3) it was violative of equal protection because
no "compelling governmental interest" had been shown for discriminating against homosexuals as a class; and (4) it was violative of her right to privacy inasmuch as her sexual orientation
could not legitimately be made a criterion for public employment .:16
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague,37but did not ad30. 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
31. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
32. Id. a t 391.
33. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
34. Id. a t 604. The statute was also found to be overbroad. Id. a t 609-10.
35. Id. a t 603-04.
36. Brief for Appellant a t 3, Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No.
5 , 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975).
37. Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 69 (1975).
The district court said that the dangers of such vagueness were: (1) the statute could
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dress itself to the other alleged constitutional violations. It also
affirmed the district court's denial of reinstatement, citing five
reasons for its affirmance. First, because Burton was not a tenured teacher, she had no property right or expectation of reemployment that required protection? Second, the nature of the
right sought to be vindicated did not warrant reinstatement.:'"
Third, it was within the trial judge's discretion to refuse to reinstate the plaintiff. The balancing of possible disruption to the
school, community, and other teachers against plaintiffs interests in completing her one-year contract was a justifiable exercise
of the court's discretion, despite the fact that reinstatement has
commonly been granted in cases where dismissal was based upon
racial discrimination or exercise of First Amendment rights."'
Fourth, the award of money damages adequately compensated
Fifth, the award of declaraBurton for her wrongful di~missal.~'
tory relief and monetary damages had sufficient admonitory effect upon the school district to deter it from similar acts in the
future? Judge Lumbard, in his dissent, took issue with all five
reasons advanced by the majority?

In determining whether to grant Burton's request for reinstatement, the court dealt primarily with three issues: the significance of the right which had been violated; the adequacy of
the remedy to redress the violated right; and the extent, if any,
to which the court should "balance the equities" involved.

,

be so broadly applied as to subject every teacher in the state to discipline; (2) a potential
for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement inheres in such a statute; (3) i t makes the
school board the arbiters of morality for the entire community; (4) i t subjects the livelihood of every teacher in the state to the irrationality and irregularity of such judgments;
(5) it fails to give fair warning of what conduct is prohibited; and (6) it permits erratic
and prejudicial exercise of authority. Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School
No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254, 255 (D. Ore. 1973), aff'd,512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 69 (1975).
38. 512 F.2d a t 852 n.1, 854.
39. The court said:
In this case, however, the nature of the constitutional right sought to be
vindicated is not such as to compel reinstatement frequently ordered in response
to racially motivated dismissals, or to those aimed a t punishing the exercise of
free speech.
Id. ~t 853 n.3.
40. Id. a t 852-53.
41. Id. a t 853-54.
42. Id. a t 854.
43. Id. a t 854-56.

538

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REV1E.W

A.

[1976:

Significance of the Nature of the Violated Right

As previously indicated, violation of a certain class of constitutional rights is almost automatically redressed by reinstatement, whereas the violation of other kinds of rights triggers the
application of traditional principles of equity to determine the
of rights to reemappropriateness of rein~tatement.~Weprivation
ployment, a property right, fall in the former class,%s do dise
missals based on race or exercise of free speech r i g h t ~ . ~ W uprocess violations, on the other hand, have not been accorded such
. ~ ~ in a
unanimous treatment with regard to r e i n ~ t a t e m e n tThus,
given case, the right which has been violated may ,determine
whether reinstatement is granted.
Of the four rights alleged by Burton to have been violated,
the court focused almost entirely on the first, the right to due
process, which the court held the school district had violated
because the dismissal was pursuant to a vague statute. The dissent, however, argued that Burton's expectation of reemployment
may have constituted a property right, the violation of which
requires reinstatement?
1. Property right

The majority of the court found that Burton's lack of tenure
was dispositive of the property right question." This position is
supported by Board of Regents v. R ~ t h , which
~"
held that a nontenured teacher, with no claim to a university rule or policy
amounting to tenure, has no property right to reemployment.
Nevertheless, the dissent in the instant case correctly points
out that lack of formal tenure is not necessarily determinative of
the property right question. The Supreme Court in Perry v.
SindermannH and in Roth indicated that where university rules
or policies provide for renewal of teaching contracts in the absence of sufficient cause for termination, or where university officials have by their words or actions implied that something akin
to a contractual agreement to tenure exists, a property right wor44. See notes 11-16 and accompanying text supra.
45. Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F. Supp. 661, 665 (D. Ida. 1974).
46. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
47. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
48. 512 F.2d at 855.
49. Id. at 852. A tenured teacher has a property right which is protected by due
process. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
50. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
51. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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thy of protection by due process safeguards must be recognized."
In an effort to establish a protectable property interest, the dissent in the instant case makes a novel argument based upon an
extension of the reasoning of Roth and Perry. An Oregon statutex:'
would have compelled school officials to furnish Burton with a
written reason for nonrenewal a t the end of her contract if they
chose not to rehire her. This requirement, together with the judicially created principle that no constitutionally impermissible
t e s Burton
reason may be given for t e r r n i n a t i ~ n , ~ ~ e m o n s t r athat
had rights beyond her one-year contract." These rights, the dissent concluded, amount to a property right requiring due process
protection?
Judge Lumbard's novel argument fails for two reasons. First,
even if one assumes that Burton did have additional rights beyond her one-year contract, it is doubtful that they rise to the
dignity of a protected property interest. The statutory requirement to furnish written reasons for nonrenewal of a teacher's
contract is far from the kind of implied tenure that the Supreme
Court in Perry indicated might create a property right." Further,
the argument that the statute requiring in writing a constitutionally acceptable reason for nonrenewal creates a property right in
Burton cannot be supported by authority. Cases dealing with the
acceptability of reasons for dismissal or nonrenewal have not described or treated the right involved as a substantive property
right. Rather, it has been characterized as a right to procedural
due process-a right not to be dismissed in an unfair fashion?
52. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 209 (1971).
53. ORE.REV.STAT.Ej 342.513(1) (1974) (formerly designated ORE. REV. STAT. §
342.635).
54. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960).
55. 512 F.2d at 855.
56. Id.; see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,599-603 (1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207,207-08 (1971).
57. There, the defendant college's official Faculty Guide provided:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of
the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as
long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy
in his work.
408 U.S. 593,600 (1972). Furthermore, in Perry, guidelines promulgated by the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and University System provided additional reassurances
of continued employment in the plaintiffs circumstances. Id. a t 600-01 n.6.
58. See Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970); Chase v.
Fall Mountain Reg. School Dist., 330 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.H. 1971). See generally Langford
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Statute void for vagueness

Since, in the majority view, no property interest was invaded
by the dismissal, the only constitutional infraction was the dismissal pursuant to a vague statute declared void by the court.
The majority felt that such a violation, standing alone, did not
compel the award of reinstatement, although dismissals violative
of other rights might well have compelled such action." The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the dismissal on the basis of
a vague statute, even though not accompanied by violations of
other rights, was sufficient to compel reinstatement."'
In determining whether dismissal under a vague statute compels reinstatement, an examination of the judicial treatment accorded violations of other types of due process rights is revealing.
In several cases, teachers dismissed in violation of due process
considerations were awarded reinstatementY It is important to
note, however, that in each of these cases the due process violation was accompanied by a violation of some other constitutional
right such as free speech or equal protection. This is true of the
Suprerne Court case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents," where the
Court indicated that the chilling effect of the statute on the exercise of free speech was almost as great as if the statute had actually proscribed free expression in certain areas." "The danger
of that chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment
rights must be guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly
inform teachers what is being p r ~ s c r i b e d . " ~ ~
v. City of Texarkana, 478 F.2d 262, 266 (8th Cir. 1973); Gieringer v. Center School Dist.
No. 58,477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); Buhr v. Buffalo School
Dist. No. 39, 364 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.D. 1973).
59. 512 F.2d at 853 n.3.
60. Id. at 855 n.1.
61. See, e.g., Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973) (English teacher dismissed in violation of due process, but because of exercise of First Amendment rights);
Cooley v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1972) (teacher dismissed because of his
civil rights activities-violation of due process found); Vega v. Civil Sew. Comm'n, 385
F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (corrections officer summarily dismissed in violation of due
process and equal protection); Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F. Supp. 661 (D. Ida. 1974) (tenured teacher discharged without a hearing-deprivation of a property right found); Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973)' aff'd,
507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.), wrt. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975) (teacher's aid dismissed and
another denied employment when it was discovered that they were the mothers of illegitimate children-violation of equal protection and due process found-injunction entered
against operation of the rule which required dismissal under such circumstances); Lucia
v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969) (teacher dismissed for wearing a beardviolation of due process found).
62. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
63. Id. at 604.
64. Id. (citations omitted).
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Abeyta v. Town of Taosa supports the proposition that the
courts in Keyishian and in other cases may have granted reinstatement because of the companion violation and not because of
the procedural due process violation. In A beyta, the district court
refused to grant reinstatement to a city policy officer who had
been dismissed in violation of statutory procedures. In denying
reinstatement, the court referred to the fact that even though a
technical violation of due process had occurred," the city had
cause to fire the police officer." The court of appeals found that,
in making such a determination, the district court did not abuse
its discretion?
The instant case is distinguishable from Keyishian and other
due process cases where reinstatement was awarded"' in that the
vagueness of the Oregon statute constituted, in the view of the
majority, the only constitutional violation suffered by the plaintiff.70Because of this absence of a companion violation, the rationale of Abeyta is arguably applicable. Although there was a
violation of due process in the instant case, it is likely that had
the statute defined "immorality" and required a nexus between
conduct and job performance, thereby obviating constitutional
objections, the school district might well have been able to justify
the firing of Burton," just as the town of Taos was able to justify
the firing of the police officer. The treatment given the procedural
violation in Abeyta lends support to the comment by the majority
in the present case that the violation of some constitutional rights
may not warrant reinstatement as a remedy.72It also weakens the
implication of the dissent that dismissals based upon a vague
statute must be redressed by the same remedies granted in dismissals based upon race or exercise of First Amendment rights.'"
65. 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974).
66. Id. a t 328. The dismissal was improper because there were not enough councilmen
present a t the meeting to constitute a quorum for voting purposes.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Cases cited note 61 supra.
70. The court recognized, however, that it was not addressing all possible issues when
it expressly stated that it would not pass on the question of whether Burton could be
denied employment strictly on the basis of her homosexual inclinations. 512 F.2d a t 854
n.5.
71. See notes 102-118 and accompanying text infra.
72. 512 F.2d a t 853 n.3.
73. Id. a t 855 n.1.
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B. Adequacy of the Remedy
After concluding that reinstatement was not compelled by
the nature of the right violated, the court proceeded to analyze
the adequacy of the other remedy granted. The court did this
pursuant to established principles of equity that require, in the
absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, examination of
the adequacy of other remedies in order to determine the appropriateness of awarding equitable relief.74Three concepts were examined with regard to the adequacy of the remedy in the instant
case: (I) compensation; (2) deterrence; and (3) vindication. The
court's treatment of the first concept, compensation, requires no
analysis. The majority gave deference to the lower court's decision that the award was sufficient to compensate Burton.'The
dissent apparently agreed that the compensatory effect of the
remedy was adequate. The second and third concepts, however,
raise difficult issues.
I.

Deterrence

The majority again gave deference to the district court's decision that the money damages awarded Burton were sufficient
to deter the school district from similar action in the future. Although no case authority was cited, the dissent asserted that the
damages were insufficient as a deterrent to future violation^.^^
When there is a possibility that a violation may recur in the
future, courts have indicated that the remedy to be granted may
be considered in light of its deterrent value. Indeed, where constitutional rights are involved, a remedy without a deterrent effect
-may be inadequate where continued violations are foreseeable.ll
Obviously, however, no deterrent short of physical restraint can
ensure that repeated violations will not occur. The deterrent factor can only reduce the probability that a violation will be repeated.
Two questions concerned with probability are important in
determining the necessity and scope of a deterrent in the remedy.
First, is the probability of repeated violations great enough to
warrant deterrence? Second, is the deterrent strong enough to
-

74. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
75. 512 F.2d a t 854.
76. Id. a t 856.
77. Cf. Walling v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 159 F.2d 395, 399 (4th Cir. 1946); Brown
v. Board of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110, 125 (N.D. Ill. 1974); United States v. Pelzer Realty
Co., 377 F. Supp. 121, 124 (M.D. Ala. 1974); D. DOBBS,supra note 9, § 7.4, a t 533.

CASE NOTES

5311

543

minimize the probability t h a t such repeated violations will
occur? As to the first question or inquiry, it should be noted that
the school board acted in good faith. At the time of Burton's
dismissal, the school board was operating under a 25-year old
law7wthat on its face did not require a nexus between immoral
Further, following the proceconduct and teaching effi~iency.'~
dure set forth in RothRoand Perry,R1the school board provided a
hearing a t which Burton had the opportunity to refute the charge
brought against her. These good faith efforts to proceed in a lawful fashion suggest a low probability of repeated school board
violations, which in turn indicates little or no need for a remedy
fashioned primarily for its deterrent effect.
Even if it is assumed, however, that a deterrent is necessary
because of the possibility of future violations, the good faith of the
school board may be considered in determining the strength of
the deterrent required. In light of the inclination of the school
district to proceed lawfully, the majority position-that a money
judgment together with a declaration that the offensive statute
is void constitutes sufficient deterrence-seems more reasonable
than the objection of the dissent.R2
2.

Vindication

It is somewhat difficult to articulate the distinction between
compensating the plaintiff and vindicating the plaintiff's rights.
Nevertheless, vindication implies something beyond merely returning the plaintiff to an equivalent positions and connotes tak78. Respondent's Response to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari a t 4, Burton v. Cascade
School Dist. Union High School No. 5, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 69 (1975).
79. Ch. 84, 9 1, [I9691 Ore. Laws (repealed by ch. 298, 5 9, [I9731 Ore. Laws).
80. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
81. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
82. The dissent stated:
If a similar situation arises in the future it might well conclude that it would be
willing to pay a few thousand dollars in order to be rid of an unwanted teacher.
512 F.2d at 856.
83. The remedy for breach of a contractual obligation is to compensate the injured
party, but there is no legal stigma that attaches to the breaching party. The treatment of
contractual breaches seems to indicate that as long as one is willing to compensate the
injured party, one may breach a contract with impunity. This is not the case with, for
instance, an invasion of privacy action. While plaintiff is compensated for his injury,
defendant may also be forced to pay punitive damages. These punitive damages, as well
as serving to deter future violations, indicate to all the world that a man's privacy cannot
be invaded with impunity. Nominal damages in a tort action could also be said to be
vindicatory because they certainly do not compensate or deter. They merely indicate that
the plaintiff was right and the defendant was wrong.
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ing vengeance for, or freeing from, questions of error, dishonor,
. ~ ~ this definition, reinstatement would
guilt, or n e g l i g e n ~ e Under
be especially appropriate as vindication if the actions of the defendant tended to cast doubt on the validity of a right.
The majority dismisses the issue of vindication without elaboration: the present case does not involve the type of right that
The dissent, however,
requires reinstatement for vindicati~n.~"
indicates that vindication is a crucial issue: the adequacy of a
remedy is determined by how well i t vindicates the violated
right!Witing Pred v. Board of Public Instructionu and Smith u.
Hampton Training School for Nurses,88the dissent argues that
constitutional rights need to be vindicated in cases of unlawful
dismissals and that they cannot be vindicated without reinstatement .x9
The position of the majority appears more persuasive. Since
Burton had no protectable property right," her only right susceptible to violation, and thus requiring vindication, was the right
not to be subject to the uncertainties and arbitrariness of a vague
statute. It appears, however, that the court's other remedial action-declaring the statute void-adequately vindicated that
right by removing any doubt about its validity. Further, both
cases cited by t h e dissent t o buttress its argument involved
violations that have customarily been redressed by reinstatement
regardless of the adequacy of other available remedies."' In Pred,
the court found that the dismissals were based upon the plaintiff's exercise of First Amendment rights." In Smith, the dismissal was based both on the plaintiffs' race and on their exercise
of free e x p r e s ~ i o n . ~ ~
C. Discretion of the Court
Even if, as the dissent argues, vindication is necessary but
lacking in the instant case, traditional equitable principles indi-

84.
85.
86.
rights."

-

WEBSTER'S
THIRDNEWINTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY
2553 (P. Grove ed. 1971).
512 F.2d a t 853 n.3.
Judge Lumbard said, "The real issue is how best to vindicate Ms. Burton's
Id. a t 856.
415 F.2d 851, 856 (5th Cir. 1969).
360 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir. 1966).
512 F.2d a t 856.
See notes 49-58 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
415 F.2d a t 856.
360 F.2d at 581.
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cate that the award of an equitable remedy remains discretionary
with the court. The court's discretion may be exercised to deny
the relief if, after "balancing the equities," it is determined that
the advantage to the plaintiff is small compared to the burden
placed upon the defendant.94
The court in the instant case discusses several issues with
regard to the "balancing of the equities." First, was it proper to
balance the equities in determining the appropriateness of reinstatement? Second, if balancing was appropriate, what factors
should have been weighed? Third, what should have been the
outcome of such a balancing test?
1. Should the balancing test be used?

T h e majority, relying on Pred v. Board of Public
Instruction," concludes that balancing is a p p r ~ p r i a t e It
. ~ is
~ not
entirely clear whether Judge Lumbard dissents on the grounds
that any balancing is inappropriate or on the grounds that the
district court inappropriately considered certain factors in the
balancing process.97
Traditional principles of equity provide that balancing is
a c ~ e p t a b l eNevertheless,
.~~
the majority's reliance on Pred, as the
dissent correctly points out,9gis inapposite. &ed stands for the
proposition that before First Amendment rights may be circumscribed in the classroom, the interests of the teacher in free expression must be weighed against the interests of the school in
maintaining order and discipline.loOBalancing relevant interests in order to determine whether the exercise of a constitutional
right may be limited is quite different from balancing competing
interests to determine whether an equitable remedy will be
granted. The former will determine whether a violation exists; the
latter presumes a violation of some interest and determines
whether and how the violation will be remedied by equity. The
factors needed to tip the scales in favor of a limitation on the
exercise of free speech ought to be considerably more weighty
than the factors necessary to outweigh plaintiffs interest in being
reinstated after dismissal under a vague statute. In spite of the
94. H. MCCLINTOCK,
supra note 10, 5 144, at 383.
95. 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
96. 512 F.2d at 853.
97. Id. at 855.
98. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
99. 512 F.2d at 856 n.3.
100. 415 F.2d at 859 (5th Cir. 1969).
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fact that Pred is not supportive of the majority position, however,
numerous other cases indicate that balancing of the equities in
section 1983 actions is warranted.lol
2.

Factors which may be considered in the balancing process

The court determined that it was not error to consider the
possible disruption to the community should Burton be reinstated? The dissent appears to object not so much to the use of
a balancing process as to the consideration of community disruption in that process.lo3Judge Lumbard thus concludes that denial
of reinstatement was an abuse of discretion.
There is authority for the position of the dissent that, assuming balancing to be warranted, some types of adverse public reaction are not appropriately weighed.'" for example, the dissent
cites Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Districtlo5and
Langford v. City of Texarkana.lo6But the dissent fails to recognize that there is no per se rule prohibiting the consideration of
community resentment resulting from reinstatement. Community resentment is properly considered or disregarded by the
courts depending on the "legitimacy"1o7of that resentment. On
this basis, the cases cited by the dissent are distinguishable from
the present case. The community resentment disregarded in
Sterzing was antagonism directed toward the exercise of First
Amendment rights, particularly speech; in Langford, the community resentment took the form of racial bias.lo8In the present
101. See, e.g., Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323, 328 (10th Cir. 1974); Smith v.
Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770, 783-84 (8th Cir. 1966); Brown v. Board of Educ., 386 F.
Supp. 110 (N.D. Ill. 1974); cf. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 219-20 (4th Cir.
1972); Knowles v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 405 F.2d 1206, 1207 (5th Cir. 1969).
102. 512 F.2d a t 853 & n.3.
103. Id. a t 855-56.
104. See Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist., 496 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir.
1974); Langford v. City of Texarkana, 478 F.2d 262, 267-68 (8th Cir. 1973); Bradley v.
Cothern, 384 F. Supp. 1216, 1224 n.17 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
105. 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974).
106. 478 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1973).
107. The words legitimacy and legitimate are used in a narrow sense in the text. If a
particular community sentiment cannot be constitutionally enshrined in a legislative
enactment, it is not "legitimate" and therefore not properly considered by a court addressing the reinstatment issue. Such sentiments would include religious and racial bias and
antagonism directed toward one espousing unpopular ideas. On the other hand, if a
particular community sentiment may constitutionally find expression in legislation, a
court may properly consider and weigh that "legitimate" sentiment.
108. Rather than prohibiting the consideration of community disruption altogether,
the courts may have determined that community disruption caused by reinstatement
simply does not outweigh the serious consequences of failing to redress these important
rights.
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case, by way of contrast, the court anticipated that Burton's status as a practicing homosexual-rather than her racial status or
her exercise of a constitutionally protected right such as
speech-would engender community resentment.
Strong arguments arise that community resentment directed
toward the employment of a practicing homosexual as a public
school teacher is legitimate and therefore worthy of judicial cognizance and consideration. Homosexuality, unlike race for example, is not a constitutionally protected status. Elimination of discrimination against homosexuality, unlike elimination of racial
bias, is not a national priority of the highest order.logIndeed, in
most states, homosexual acts are criminal.l1° Further, the expression of antihomosexual sentiments in criminal statutes has been
deemed a legitimate and not constitutionally infirm legislative
exercise.
Given the legitimacy of antihomosexual sentiments when
expressed in other contexts, a court may not be justified in refusing to consider such sentiments or failing to anticipate community resentment resulting from reinstatement. Where community sentiments against homosexuality exist or can reasonably
be anticipated, no persuasive reason appears for judicially disregarding those sentiments in the balancing process attendant upon
the fashioning of remedies. In short, it appears that the community's antihomosexual sentiments were properly included in
the balancing equation in the present case.
3. Result of the balancing test

Applying the balancing test, the majority concluded that
denial of reinstatement was not an abuse of discretion.l12 The
dissent disagreed, pointing out, probably correctly, that community disruption alone may not be sufficient to justify the denial of reinstatement in the instant case.l13 Other considerations,
however, such a s the impairment of Burton's teaching effi~ i e n c y , "loss
~ of public confidence in the school system, and the
109. See Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual
Conduct, 72 MICH.L. REV.1613 (1974). See also Comment, Homosexuality and the
84 (1973).
Law-A Right to be Different?, 38 ALBANYL. REV.
110. See Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273,
280-87 (1971).
111. See, e.g., Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971), vacating Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Suppi 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
112. 512 F.2d at 852.
113. Id. at 855-56.
114. The court assumed that a diminution in teaching efficiency would result from
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availability of other employment, l i 5 support the conclusion that
the burden to the school district outweighs the interest of the
plaintiff in being reinstated. Further, Burton's open acknowledgment of her homosexual status, although perhaps not amounting
to advocacy of a lifestyle, arguably brings her case within the
rationale of McConnell v. Anderson116where the court upheld a
school board's refusal to hire a homosexual librarian whose application with another male for a marriage license had been widely
reported by the news media. The court felt that to require the
school to hire the man would permit him "to foist tacit approval
of this socially repugnant concept upon his employer."l17
In conclusion, neither the district court nor the majority on
the circuit court panel erred in balancing the competing interests.
The impairment of the ability of Burton to be an effective teacher
and the disruption to the orderly functioning of the school district
in a n atmosphere of community confidence, especially in light of
the concern which courts have traditionally demonstrated for students and other impressionable groups,llS strongly counterbalances Burton's interest in reinstatement.
the reluctance of parents to allow their children to be taught by Burton, reluctance of
students to be taught by her, and reluctance of fellow teachers to work with her.
115. Since all record of the reason for dismissal had been expunged from the records
of the school, the actions of the school board had little chance of reducing Burton's ability
to find new employment. 512 F.2d a t 852.
116. 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
117. Id. a t 196.
118. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, 16 Cal. App. 3d 820, 827, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 318, 323 (Ct. App. 1971); Safransky v. State Personnel Board, 62 Wis. 2d 464, 47576, 215 N.W.2d 379, 384-85 (1974).

